President Barack Obama and his team of advisors are stuck between a rock and a hard place in unforgiving Afghanistan:  The August 20 elections appear to have been riddled with fraudulent activities, allegedly directed by President Hamid Karzai.  Karzai is currently leading with 46 percent, besting his closest rival Dr. Abullah Abdullah, who has about 35 percent, as the count continues.  Abdullah flew down to Kandahar Tuesday to receive the endorsement of the Bariz leaders, a southern tribe who have accused Karzai and his advisors of stuffing 23,900 ballots, a notably brazen act.

But the endorsement of Abdullah never happened.  Aides to Mr. Karzai’s brother, Ahmed Wali, seized all the ballots in the Shorabak District on election day and shipped them to Kabul; reportedly every ballot was marked for Karzai. The Afghan Electoral Complaints Commission has received 2,729 complaints of electoral irregularities to date.

No one expected this election to be without challenges.  There is not a single country in democratic transition that doesn’t have technical problems.  But with each passing day, Karzai, who tried (with out much success) to convince the United States and, more importantly, the Afghan people that the election would not be fraudulent, looks weaker and weaker — and at a time when the Taliban has become far more sophisticated in its strategy and tactics.  Meanwhile, July saw 43 American soldiers die — the greatest single monthly tally since the war began.

Not only does the administration have this situation to ponder, but Tuesday’s morning news greeted us with a Taliban proclaimed assassination of Abdullah Laghmani, the deputy director of Afghanistan’s intelligence bureau, who had been investigating Taliban for criminal network activities. Meanwhile, Lt. Gen. Stanley Chrystal, commander of NATO troops in Afghanistan has presented a new strategy to the Pentagon that included a request for more troops (rumored to be up to 40,000 additional soldiers equaling to two Army divisions) to get Afghanistan back on track.

As Obama’s approval numbers hover at 50 percent approval (mostly due to the health care debate) Americans’ enthusiasm for a sustained Afghanistan war could also decrease.  Apparently White House staff are also concerned whether Americans have an appetite for expanding the war, especially given the continued engagement in Iraq and a sputtering economy to contend with at home.  In fact, if anything should grab the president’s eye it should be that 56 percent of Americans believe the country is on the wrong track, according to a recent poll on Pollster.com.  The sagging economy has to be a contributing drag on those numbers.

First out of the gate to criticize Obama’s Afghan war, was George Will, the conservative columnist who wrote in the Washington Post:

U.S. forces are being increased by 21,000, to 68,000, bringing the coalition total to 110,000. About 9,000 are from Britain, where support for the war is waning. Counterinsurgency theory concerning the time and the ratio of forces required to protect the population indicates that, nationwide, Afghanistan would need hundreds of thousands of coalition troops, perhaps for a decade or more. That is inconceivable.

So, instead, forces should be substantially reduced to serve a comprehensively revised policy: America should do only what can be done from offshore, using intelligence, drones, cruise missiles, airstrikes and small, potent Special Forces units, concentrating on the porous 1,500-mile border with Pakistan, a nation that actually matters.

Genius, said de Gaulle, recalling Bismarck’s decision to halt German forces short of Paris in 1870, sometimes consists of knowing (his italics) when to stop.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the joint chiefs, conducted a joint press briefing this afternoon strongly defending President Obama’s March war strategy, but Mullen candidly admitted that “there was a sense of urgency” and time was not on their side.  Mullen underscored the urgency of the mission by saying he believed they had to reverse the security situation “over the next 12 to 18 months.”

Gates discussed Lt. Gen. McChrystal’s secret report indicating that he had received it two days ago and informally sent it to the president for his review.  Gates also said that he would be meeting with President Obama next week  to discuss the report’s security assessment with him and members of the National Security Council.  But he pointedly said that all decisions about additional resources would not be made until that review process was completed, including the Joint Chiefs, as well as General Petreus, the commander of Southern Command.

Both men were emphatic that the main objective of the March strategy was to protect the Afghani people and to build up Afghani security forces over time.  Reporters challenged Mullen as this strategy being “very manpower intensive.”  But Mullen explained McChrystal’s tactical strategy to be “very direct, very face-to-face”and has made that tactical strategy the number one priority for U.S. forces.

While noting that not all of the 21,000 troops approved by the President in March had yet arrived to Afghanistan, Gates said he was concerned about the U.S. forces’ footprint becoming overly  intrusive, based upon the history of a country which has reflected in the past that ”a tipping point can be reached when outside forces become part of the problem than rather the solution.”

Gates is wise to point out the history of Afghanistan as its militias have demonstrated countless times that it is none too intimidated by great powers and tossed out the British Empire, not once, but twice in the 19th century, followed by the Soviet Empire in the 20th century.

As the President takes a break from the pressures of the Oval office at Camp David over the weekend, it is the time for him to consider a number of sobering critiques by those outside the Administration.  The following questions should be considered:

• What are the objectives of the Afghanistan war?  If we are not nation building, then what are the outcomes the Administration intends to achieve and to what end?
• How many lives is the Administration willing to lose?  5,000, 10,000, 15,000, or 20,000 casualties?  How long will the American public support such an operation without jeopardizing the president’s ability to effectively govern at home and in the world?
• Given the fact that the U.S. cut two active Army divisions in the 1990s and the troop withdrawal in Iraq will take time, where are the soldiers going to come from?  The active Army components, as well as the reservists and guardsmen, are contributing well above what can be expected.
• How much more money can the U.S. government spend on this war, in view of a troubled economy?

Until we see answers, it’s going to be hard for the Administration to win not only the war over there, but the battle for public opinion at home.

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