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19 September 2009 Charles J. Brown
08:55 pm

Saturday Surprise: A Breakthrough in the Middle East?


Not to put too fine a point on it:  Holy Crap.

Via the apparently sleepless and time-off-less Laura Rozen:

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
__________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release September 19, 2009

Statement from White House press secretary Robert Gibbs

On Tuesday, September 22, President Obama will host a trilateral meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. The trilateral meeting will be immediately preceded by bilateral meetings between President Obama and the two leaders. These meetings will continue the efforts of President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Special Envoy George Mitchell to lay the groundwork for the relaunch of negotiations, and to create a positive context for those negotiations so that they can succeed.

“It is another sign of the President’s deep commitment to comprehensive peace that he wants to personally engage at this juncture, as we continue our efforts to encourage all sides to take responsibility for peace and to create a positive context for the resumption of negotiations,” said Special Envoy Mitchell.

Wow.  Talk about close-hold.  I don anyone sawcoming.  Just earlier this week there were several articles suggesting that the negotiations were stalled and that nothing was going to happen soon (sorry — posting quickly; will try to get the links up later).   So much for that theory.

If George Mitchell actually is the one pulling this off (and assuming that it actually leads to something more than another faux deal), think about what that means:  he will go down as one great — if not the greatest — peacemakers of our time.  First Northern Ireland, and now this.  And with little fanfare and even less attention.

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4 June 2009 Charles J. Brown
06:58 pm

Obama’s Speech I: Israel-Palestine


I didn’t have the opportunity to do so while at work today, so I’m just now getting around to listening to (and digesting) Obama’s speech in Cairo today, and reading some of the analysis.  My favorite so far comes from an unlikely source — The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg:

An African-American President with Muslim roots stands before the Muslim world and defends the right of Jews to a nation of their own in their ancestral homeland, and then denounces in vociferous terms the evil of Holocaust denial, and right-wing Israelis go forth and complain that the President is unsympathetic to the housing needs of settlers. Incredible, just incredible.

Unsurprisingly, it’s not just right-wing Israelis who can’t see the forest for the trees.  Via Time Magazine’s Joe Klein (h/t):

About an hour after Barack Obama’s excellent Cairo speech, I met with Khaled Meshal, the leader of Hamas, at his office here to talk about the speech and the Israel-Palestine conflict. . . .

“Undoubtedly Obama speaks a new language,” he told me. “His speech was cleverly designed… The essence of the speech was to improve the U.S. image and to placate the Muslims. We don’t mind either objective, but we are looking for more than just mere words. If the United States wishes to open a new page, we definitely would welcome this. We are keen to contribute to this. But we [believe that can not happen] merely with words. It must be with deeds, by changing the policy on the ground.” . . .

“Palestinian actions are reactions. What Palestinians do is to resist the occupation,” he said. “It is self-defense. Why did the Americans support the Mujaheddin against the Soviets in Afghanistan? Why did the British support the French agains the Nazis? Why did you have a revolution against the British? Self-defense.”

I made the obvious point about the difference between self-defense and targeting civilians. “But civilians die in wars,” one of Meshal’s aides pitched in. “You call it collateral damage.”

And so it goes.

More on the speech to come.

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23 January 2009 Charles J. Brown
11:07 am

Israel: So Why Exactly Did It Go to War?


Remember how the Israeli attack on Gaza had supposedly destroyed the network of tunnels between Gaza and Egypt?  According to Danger Room, (as Jon Stewart would say), uh, not so much:

The Israeli military bombed hundreds of tunnels during the Gaza war — to shut down Hamas‘ weapons-smuggling routes, and to put pressure on Egypt to the militants from getting more. But just days after the battle’s end, those tunnels are re-opening, with Hamas in charge.

Hamas has seized control of all the smuggling tunnels under the Philadelphi Corridor in southern Gaza and has been moving additional arms into the Strip since Operation Cast Lead ended on Sunday morning,” the Jerusalem Post reports. Those passages, “are usually run by local Palestinian clans, and Hamas’s decision to take control is believed to be part of the group’s attempts to reestablish its regime in Gaza. Hamas can now decide what is smuggled into the Strip and give priority to weapons and explosives.”

At the beginning of the conflict, I noted that the Olmert government appeared to lack any clear strategic vision of what it wanted to achieve and why it thought war was the only way to achieve it.  Now, with a fragile cease-fire in place and Israeli troops having completed their withdrawal from the strip, we find out that one of the supposed tactical objectives of the war — closure of the tunnels — not only wasn’t successful, but is now actually worse:  Hamas remains large and now is in charge.

I am no Middle East expert (I suggest if you want first-rate analysis on the conflict and its aftermath, go to Daniel Levy’s outstanding blog), but I can see.  As far as I can tell, here’s where we are now that the conflict has “ended.”

1.  The tunnels remain open and are now under the control of Hamas.

2.  Hamas’s leadership remains largely intact.

3.  Although Hamas’s control over Gaza is, by some reports, less tenuous, Fatah’s control over the West Bank suffered far greater damage, from which it may never recover.

4.  There are increasing calls for an international investigation into allegations that the Israeli military used white phosphorus rounds indiscriminately — and in the process helping to obscure the fact that Hamas’s firing of rockets and its use of human shields clearly constitute war crimes.

5.  The war appears to have hurt Kadima and its allies politically; were the elections to be held today, Likud would sweep to victory and Benjamin Netanyahu would become prime minister.

6.  Although it’s unclear whether those on the Palestinian side who lost their lives in the conflict were predominantly Hamas fighters or civilians, international opinion has largely coalesced around the idea that a significant number of civilians were killed indiscriminately as a result of both the bombardment and invasion.

7.  As a result, Israel is even more isolated internationally than it was before, and now must deal with an American administration that, while committed to supporting Israel, is less likely to tolerate such foolishness in the future.

8.  And perhaps most relevant to the casus belli that started this whole mess, Hamas is busily rebuilding its capacity to fire rockets into Israel.

So why exactly did Israel go to war?  And what exactly did it accomplish — other than to weaken further the government’s own position both domestically and internationally?  And how does this differ from what happened in Lebanon a few years ago?

Did you learn anything from that conflict?  Anything at all?  Bueller?

Stupid would not be too strong a word to describe this mess.

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3 January 2009 Charles J. Brown
08:52 pm

Gaza: Israel Invades


So the land attack has begun.  I think Spencer Ackerman (as usual) gets it about right:

According to Ha’aretz, a significant portion of Israeli “top commanders” dissented from the decision to invade, arguing that the airstrikes had already dealt Hamas a “heavy blow” and that Israeli casualties could be heavy as well. Clearly they shared the concern that Israel was escalating the war without regard for strategy. How will Israel de-escalate? How can it invade Gaza on the empty goal to engage in an “all-out war” with Hamas and plausibly leave before that unfulfillable end-state is achieved? How can Israeli commanders and politicians who believe a war is going well be persuaded to back down before they commit hubristic blunders that decimate the people of Gaza and make sustainable peace and security less achievable?

. . .[E}very hour Israel is in Gaza pummeling them without destroying them is an hour that Hamas will be able to claim that more plausibly, just like Hezbollah did in 2006. That's how these types of asymmetric wars work; and also why it's better for the larger party not to launch them. Israel may not want to hear this now, but it's playing on Hamas' strategic terms. Stepping back is the truer "success" at this point. . . .

If it's difficult to understand what Israel is doing, I'd submit that that's because Israel doesn't really know what it's doing. All countries blunder. It's up to their foul-weather friends to pull them back from the brink.

What we have here is a civilian leadership uninterested in or unwilling to listen to its senior military commanders.  Of course, we've heard this story before, not just in Israel (the 2006 war against Hezbollah) but also in the United States (Iraq).

Somebody needs to smack these guys upside the head.  Military action for its own sake isn't strategy, it's masturbation.

This is what I wrote in two separate posts earlier this week:

If either Israel or the Palestinian Authority think that eliminating Hamas as a military threat will move the region toward peace, they’re sadly mistaken. The attack represents a failure of imagination, an inability to understand that it will further radicalize a population already inclined to support Hamas (not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank).

The conflict may result in fewer rocket attacks, but it’s also likely to increase suicide bombings.  It’s as if Olmert doesn’t understand that he’s repeating his own mistakes in Lebanon. That’s why I think this has little to do with the threat posed by Hamas (no matter how real) and more to do with domestic politics.  The real targets here are the political fortunes of Bibi Netanyahu and Likud.

-----

It still isn’t clear to me that [the Israelis] know what they’re doing. . .[or] have any exit strategy.

I’ll repeat what I said earlier:  this isn’t about Gaza, it’s about winning the next election. Labor/Kadima is trying to out-Likud Likud.

One more thing:  here’s Yglesias earlier today.

So far, though, the fighting has succeeded in boosting the incumbent Labor/Kadima coalition’s poll numbers versus their Likud adversaries. So that’s something, I guess.

That’s something, you guess?  So war in the name of politics is okay?  I’m shocked (and not in the Casablanca meaning of the word). Yglesias, who wrote a very good book about why Democrats shouldn’t act like Republicans when it comes to foreign policy, can’t see that Labor/Kadima is doing the very thing for which he condemned the pro-Iraq Democrats.

Well, not exactly the same thing — they’re in charge.

I hope the Obama team is paying attention.

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30 December 2008 Charles J. Brown
10:06 pm

Quote of the Day


Zbigniew Brzezinski, responding to another stupid Joe Scarborough question (h/t Steve Clemons):

You know, you have such a stunningly superficial knowledge of what went on that it’s almost embarrassing to listen to you.

And remember, Scarborough’s co-host is Mika Brzezinski, Zbig’s daughter.

Heh.

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30 December 2008 Charles J. Brown
07:36 am

Gaza II


It looks like the Israelis are going all in.  It still isn’t clear to me that they a) know what they’re doing; b) understand that a ground war better do the job (and do it quickly) or we’re looking at Second Lebanon War II; and c) have any exit strategy.

It might be worthwhile to look at the relevant sections of the Winograd Report (pdf link here):

The decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike was not based on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan, based on carefull study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena . A meticulous examination of these characteristics would have revealed the following: the ability to achieve military gains having significant political-international weight was limited; an Israeli military strike would inevitably lead to missiles fired at the Israeli civilian north; there was not other effective military response to such missile attacks than an extensive and prolonged ground operation to capture the areas from which the missiles were fired - which would have a high “cost” and which did not enjoy broad support. These difficulties were not explicitly raised with the political leaders before the decision to strike was taken.

Consequently, in making the decision to go to war, the government did not consider the whole range of options, including that of continuing the policy of ‘containment’, or combining political and diplomatic moves with military strikes below the ‘escalation level’, or military preparations without immediage military action. . . . This failure reflects weakness in strategic thinking, which derives the response to the event from a more comprehensive and encompassing picture. . . .

Some of the declared goals of the war were not clear and could not be achieved, and in part were not achieveable by the authorized modes of military action. . . .

On the political-security strategic level, the lack of preparedness was also caused by the failure to update and fully articulate Israel’s security strategy doctrine, in the fullest sense of that term, so that it could not serve as a basis for coping comprehensively will all the challenges facing Israel. . . .

Israel’s government in its plenum failed in its political function of taking full responsibility for its decisions. It did not explore and seek adequate response for various reservations that were raised, and authorized an immediate military strike that was not thought-through and suffered from over-reliance on the judgment of the primary decision-makers.

I recognize that Israel would be foolish to explain its strategy, tactics, motives or planning up front, but given the Olmert government’s track record, there’s no evidence that they’ve learned anything from their own mistakes.

One other note:  although we do not yet know whether Israel’s attacks have intentionally targeted civilians, we do know that Hamas’s rocket attacks and suicide bombings have.  Any postwar investigation will be credible only if it looks at alleged misdeeds by all parties.

And given the dismal track record of the UN Human Rights Council — which has spent most of its tenure passing toothless resolutions condemning Israel while ignoring not only the actions of Hamas and Hezbollah, but also other egregious human rights violations the world over — I am not confident that it, or any other UN body, is capable conducting an impartial investigation.

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29 December 2008 Charles J. Brown
11:46 am

Gaza


I don’t know if I have much to add to the discussion about the current crisis in Gaza.  I am appalled by the Israelis’ indifference toward civilian casualties but at the same time find myself understanding their desire to end the threat posed by Hamas.  And Hamas’s willingness to fire rockets at civilians (and their use of suicide bombing) is despicable.

If either Israel or the Palestinian Authority think that eliminating Hamas as a military threat will move the region toward peace, they’re sadly mistaken. The attack represents a failure of imagination, an inability to understand that it will further radicalize a population already inclined to support Hamas (not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank).

The conflict may result in fewer rocket attacks, but it’s also likely to increase suicide bombings.  It’s as if Olmert doesn’t understand that he’s repeating his own mistakes in Lebanon. That’s why I think this has little to do with the threat posed by Hamas (no matter how real) and more to do with domestic politics.  The real targets here are the political fortunes of Bibi Netanyahu and Likud.

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8 September 2008 Charles J. Brown
02:45 pm

Beyond November: Ruben E. Brigety


The Connect U.S. Fund has launched a new two-year initiative to help shape debate during the upcoming Presidential transition.  As part of this effort, they’ve asked leading thinkers and advocates to talk about what should be the top two or three foreign policy priorities for the next President.  They’ve also kindly allowed us to cross-post the responses here.

The series took a brief hiatus during the conventions, but it’s back and will continue from now until the election.  Today, we’ll hear from Rube E. Brigety.  Future posts in the series will appears every Thursday.  You can find the previous posts here.  Thanks again to Heather Hamilton and Eric Schwartz for making the cross-postings happen.

Regardless of who wins the Presidential election in November, America will face challenges around the world that are arguably unprecedented in their complexity and scope. The list of urgent issues is well known – two active wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the quest for peace between Israelis and Palestinians, the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran, resurgent powers in China and Russia, a weakened U.S. dollar, the need for energy independence, and the effects of climate change, just to name a few.

A common thread connecting all of these problems is that they cannot be solved with the approaches that have dominated U.S. foreign policy for the last eight years. For much of the last decade, particularly since 9/11, our government has resorted to unilateral methods to solve multilateral problems, and resorted to the use or threat of force to advance our interests abroad. Time and again, this has contributed to America’s declining popularity in the world even as it strains our military, marginalizes our alliances, and leaves crucial problems to fester. All of this can be traced to a zero-sum world view which does not tangibly link the security and prosperity of the United States with needs and aspirations of most of the world.

Our country needs more than new policies to confront the foreign policy challenges of the next decade. It needs a new worldview. It needs a framework for understanding the limits of unilateralism and military might, and the potential in cooperation and non-military methods of influence.

At the Center for American Progress, we have advanced an idea called “Sustainable Security.” An amalgamation of national security, collective security and human security, the Sustainable Security paradigm recognizes the importance of improving the lives of other people around the world as a critical security concerns for the United States. Rather than seeing foreign assistance as charity best relegated to the periphery of our statecraft, sustainable security emphasizes investing in social and economic development in countries around the world as a means of countering various threats – from the growth of radical extremism to the ravages of climate change. Furthermore, it posits that true “security” for the United States and other countries can only happen when development assistance is pursued in a cooperative manner with other countries and when it is closely coordinated with our other diplomatic and defense priorities. While there will always be a place for use of force, sustainable security argues that we have as much to gain from investing in the welfare of others as we do from investing in weapons systems to advance our nation’s security interests.

From this worldview, a few important foreign policy priorities follow. First, the United States should adopt a National Development Strategy. Despite the fact that we spend more on development assistance than any other country in the world, we do not have an articulated strategy to guide its distribution or to relate it to other aspects of American foreign policy. Promulgating a National Development Strategy from the White House that is applicable to every federal agency involved in delivering assistance would be a major statement of the important of foreign aid to our national security and provide crucial guidance for this important instrument of policy.

Second, we will have to reform the structures that deliver foreign assistance. The most important reforms should include the creation of a cabinet level development agency and a recapitalization our development infrastructure. Most of our allies that are major donors of development assistance have a cabinet agency to direct that activity. We are in the distinct minority in this regard. Elevating development assistance to a cabinet level status will not only show how important it is for us, but it will also ensure that development considerations are appropriately accounted for in our foreign policy. The next time we are forced to go to war with another country, we would be much more likely to take into account post-conflict considerations about economic reconstruction and rule of law if we have a powerful agency whose job it was to think about it and to perform the required tasks. Also, we cannot make development a major part of our foreign policy as long as there are more drummers in military bands than there are development professionals in the employ of our government. With less than one-thousand Foreign Service officers assigned to the U.S. Agency for International Development, our ability to do vital development projects, and to support our defense and diplomatic initiatives, is imperiled. This is a situation which must be reversed.

With great risk comes great opportunity, and this is particularly true for the next Presidential administration. Changing how we approach the problems of the world is vital to achieving durable solutions for ourselves and our allies. Let’s hope our next President take on the challenge.

Reuben E. Brigety, II is Director of the Sustainable Security Program at The Center for American Progress. Prior to joining CAP, he served as a Special Assistant in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development.  Brigety is also an Assistant Professor of Government and Politics at George Mason University. He is the author of Ethics, Technology and the American Way of War (Routledge, 2007) and a variety of other articles and book chapters. Before entering academia, Brigety was a researcher with the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch. He served on HRW research missions in Afghanistan in March 2002 and in Iraq in April and May of 2003. He also served as HRW’s coordinator for crisis management during the Iraq war and as an HRW delegate to the Convention on Conventional Weapons negotiations in Geneva. Before joining HRW, Brigety was an active duty U.S. naval officer and held several staff positions in the Pentagon and in fleet support units.

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22 July 2008 Charles J. Brown
02:00 pm

Obama Wins the Meme Wars


Three days into his much-ballyhooed trip (and with a huge assist from Nour al Maliki), it’s become clear that Obama has won the meme wars.  Take, for example, this photo, which ran all over the place:

Read the rest of this entry »

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19 July 2008 Charles J. Brown
02:34 pm

More on “The 300″ and Obama’s Experience


So I’ve gotten some interesting feedback, mainly via email, about last night’s post on The 300.  My good friend Steve Clemons at The Washington Note, agrees with me that the Times piece is a misfire. Not sure I agree with him, however, that Obama is “colonizing” the DC foreign policy community.  If he were, I doubt he would have only 300 folks in the network.  Or consciously exclude people like Richard Holbrooke and Zbigniew Brzezinski even if the former is Tony Lake’s rival and the latter has some outside-the-mainstream ideas on Middle East peace.

I know that to some of you, this may seem like little more than inside baseball.  Who really cares how many people are advising Obama?  Shouldn’t it matter more what kind of advice he’s getting?  To which I can only offer one response:

Exactly.

But the problem is that the mainstream media — and to a lesser degree some of my friends in the blogosphere — seem determined to portray Obama as “inexperienced” on foreign policy.  Just today, The Washington Post has a front page story with the following headline and sub-head:

Obama Going Abroad with World Watching
Foreign Policy Credentials Are At Stake

Huh?  Obama’s future credibility will be determined by what he does on a single week-long trip to Europe and the Middle East?  A trip that doesn’t include China, India, Japan, Latin America, Africa, or a whole bunch of other important places?  A trip that his opponent kept criticizing him for not taking until he started criticizing him for taking it?

Let’s acknowledge the reality here.  The trip is window-dressing.  Yes, it is designed to show Americans that Obama knows something about foreign policy.  But the only reason it’s getting this kind of coverage is that it’s late July and the media doesn’t have anything better to do than speculate on whether Obama’s entire candidacy will hinge on a few photo-ops.

The real story here is that the media continue to embrace a deeply corrosive — and oh yeah, completely wrong — meme that is, after all, little more than a a set of McCain campaign talking points.  “Obama is over his head.” “Obama doesn’t have the experience to be commander in chief.”  “Obama doesn’t know anything about foreign policy.”  “Obama is a rookie and we can’t have a rookie in charge right now.” “Obama is very very scaaaaary.”

What utter nonsense.  On issue after issue — Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and more — Obama has taken positions that have proven to be far more sensible and realistic than those taken by either McCain or Bush.  He is more thoughtful, more realistic, more pragmatic, and perhaps most importantly, more often right than John McCain.  The only thing he isn’t is more experienced.

But if “experience” were the only prerequisite for the presidency, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney (ARGH! MY EYES!), Joe Biden, and Bill Richardson would be our candidates.

So instead of asking who is more experienced, maybe the media should ask who has the better ideas.  Maybe they should look at who has been more adaptive in responding to changing conditions on the ground.  And maybe they should stop mislabeling flexibility as flip-flops.

Nah.  That would require reporters to think.  Wouldn’t want that.  Making stuff up is a lot more fun.

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