In case you missed the big South Asia story of the weekend, here it is, via WaPo:

Unable to crush street protests Sunday that spilled out of this city and threatened to reach the capital, the Pakistani government announced early Monday morning that it would restore the former chief justice of the Supreme Court and a group of other deposed judges in a major capitulation to opponents.

The move reflected the weakening position of President Asif Ali Zardari, a key U.S. ally, but it also signaled a peaceful end to a mounting political crisis in the nuclear-armed Muslim nation of 172 million. Zardari had resisted bringing back former chief justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry for months, but he faced mounting pressure from a broad coalition of opponents who demanded the reinstatement of Pakistan’s independent judiciary and threatened to march on the capital, Islamabad, until Chaudhry was brought back.

The decision marked an extraordinary victory for Pakistan’s legal community, which has been agitating peacefully for the judges’ reinstatement for the past two years, and for Zardari’s major political rival, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, who joined the lawyers’ crusade last month and quickly became its most forceful advocate.

It’s always the same in Pakistan, to a point of dreary familiarity:  protests = instability = weakened regime.  I get the feeling that WaPo merely trots out the same basic story every eightteen to thirty-six months.  With some minor changes, this lede could have been about the protests that led to Musharraf’s downfall, or even about the events that led Musharraf to depose Sharif.

So in the spirit of helping WaPo save time the next time this happens, I thought I would create a Pakistan version of Mad Libs:

Unable to verb type of demonstration day of week that spilled out of city in Pakistan and threatened to reach the capital, the Pakistani government announced early following day that it would verb political opponent in a major capitulation to opposition group .

The move reflected the weakening position of current leader , a key U.S. ally, but it also signaled a peaceful/violent end to a mounting political crisis in the nuclear-armed Muslim nation of 172 million. Current leader had resisted verb political opponent for unit of time ,  but he faced adjective noun from a broad coalition of opposition figures , who demanded reinstatement of/release of/an end to opposition figure/branch of government and threatened to type of protest in/on the capital, Islamabad, until political opponent was brought back.

The decision marked an extraordinary victory for Pakistan’s pro-democracy group/fundamentalists/NGO community/opposition party , which has been agitating violently/peacefully for political opponent ’s reinstatement/release for the past unit of time , and for current leader ’s major political rival, rival’s name , who joined the synonym for protest last unit of time and quickly became its most forceful advocate.

It has become a cliché to describe Pakistan as a failed state.  I don’t think that’s entirely accurate — Pakistan hasn’t failed so much as found itself stuck in a cycle of pseudo-democracy, corruption/incompetence, coup, dictatorship, protest, end of dictatorship, and then back to pseudo-democracy again.  That’s not so much failure as it is a long, slow death spiral.  And with each turn, the fundamentalists get a little stronger.

Regardless of how you describe it, Pakistan clearly wins the award for the country most-likely-to-screw-up-everybody’s-plans-by-creating-a-big-honking-mess-at-home-or-in-neighboring-state.  Afghanistan may be a chaotic mess, but it doesn’t have nuclear arms.  North Korea may have nuclear arms, but it doesn’t have to contend with Islamic fundamentalists. Iran may have Islamic fundamentalists trying to build a bomb, but a) they’re Shiites rather than Sunnis, and thus do not enjoy the widespread support of other radical Islamists; and b) they haven’t (as far as we know) built the bomb yet.

Pakistan, in contrast, has it all:  it is an enormous mess; has a system of government that has remained consistently unstable; is a nuclear power; and has a large contingent of religious fanatics within its borders.

We are still paying for Bush’s inexplicable failure to demand that Musharraf take action against those in the ISI and military who were responsible for sponsoring both the Taliban in Afghanistan and the  Lashkar-e-Taiba in Kashmir.   In the end, the Bush Administration’s Pakistan policies — rather than Iraq or Afghanistan — may be remembered as its most disastrous foreign policy mistake — as well as the greatest risk to Obama’s ability to purse a smarter course in foreign policy.

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