As you’ve probably already heard, the Senate confirmed Hillary Clinton yesterday, and today she made her first appearance at State. If her speech at the welcoming ceremony represents the direction she plans to take the Department, it augurs well for the next four years. Take, for example, what she had to say about personnel:
In my testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, I spoke a lot about smart power. Well, at the heart of smart power are smart people, and you are those people. And you are the ones that we will count on and turn to for the advice and counsel, the expertise and experience to make good on the promises of this new Administration. . . .
This is not going to be easy. (Laughter.) I don’t want anybody to leave this extraordinarily warm reception thinking, oh, good — (laughter) — you know, this is going to be great. It’s going to be hard. But if it weren’t hard, somebody else could do it, besides the professionals of the Foreign Service and the Civil Service and our Diplomatic and Development Corps.
So it looks like she understands the need to build morale in what has become an incredibly dispirited institution.
Unfortunately for her, that’s not the only institutional challenge she faces. Here are four more that will require considerable time and energy to fix.
1. The disastrously inefficient organizational chart. Secretary Clinton inherits a State Department that is a hodgepodge of agencies, bureaus, and offices. The past few Administrations (including that of her husband) have only made the situation worse , never in the process thinking through how such proliferation interferes with policy-making. Congress also has contributed to the problem, legislating “solutions” to policy issues by creating new offices.
This disorganization has produced bureaucratic turf battles, mangled flow charts and inefficient decision-making. Each Administration tends to move the chairs around without thinking through a more comprehensive approach. To cite a few examples, the Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes issues resides in Office of the Secretary, but most policy on those issues comes from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL). Similarly, democracy policy-making is divided between DRL and the Office of the Undersecretary for Democracy and Global Affairs (which used to be merely Global Affairs during the Clinton Administration). The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement was, under Bush, moved from Global Affairs to the Office of the Undersecretary for Political Affairs even though the latter consists primarily of regional bureaus. Meanwhile, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs resides not in Political Affairs, but in the Office of the Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security.
Such bureaucratic chaos has had a direct impact on policy-making. Fiefdoms fight over who will take the lead on a given policy. Once those disagreements are resolved, the resultant “decision memo” have to be cleared by all relevant bureaus. That process — which was supposed to ensure that no bureau could set policy without input from other stakeholders — has instead become a tangled mess.
For example, when I used to write the introduction to the Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, I had to get the clearance of every bureau/agency/office whose issue/country was mentioned. The last year I was there, over 250 different bureaus/agencies/office had to clear the final document. And every time one of them made a change, I had to go back to the others affected to approve the change. Making matters even worse was the phenomenon of “CYA (cover your ass) clearances” — where a particular office would tell me that they would clear it, but only if I first got another office to clear it.
Much of this can be fixed through a thoughtful reorganization of the Department so that lines of communication are simplified and clearances kept to a minimum. But that means more than moving the deck chairs around so that they make a lovely new pattern. It requires real thinking about what can make the process more efficient without denying particular Bureaus the ability to participate in the policy-making process.
2. Funding. In a time of economic turmoil and massive government spending, it is essential that the Administration not forget its promise to expand significantly the State Department’s resources and personnel. Hillary’s speech today points to that commitment:
There are three legs to the stool of American foreign policy: defense, diplomacy, and development. And we are responsible for two of the three legs. And we will make clear, as we go forward, that diplomacy and development are essential tools in achieving the long-term objectives of the United States. And I will do all that I can, working with you, to make it abundantly clear that robust diplomacy and effective development are the best long-term tools for securing America’s future.
A big part of the new funding should go to expanding the foreign service. Part should go, as noted above, to important institutional reforms. And a significant chunk also should go to updating the building’s incredibly outdated technology.
Despite the Administration’s promises, some pundits already are predicting that it won’t happen. Yesterday, Gideon Rose, the managing editor of Foreign Affairs, went on Marketplace and predicted that the Department would not get the resources it needs:
[T]he new administration basically has very little in the bank account and a lot of debts that it’s racking up. And so it’s not going to be looking for any major new financial spending or commitments on foreign policy or national security issues. And it’s going to try to wind down the conflicts it inherited while avoiding any new ones.
He’s mistaken for several reasons. First, expanding State does not involve new resources. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has stated repeatedly (most recently in Foreign Affairs) that he supports using part of the existing DOD budget to fund State’s expansion. Second, should the Administrations successfully wind down the war in Iraq, that will free up significant funds, some of which could go to State. Third, any institutional reform will, over the long run, free up a small pot of money (not enough, to be clear) that could be used to repair the existing system.
To put it another way, adopting a pay-as-you-go (or pay-go, as it’s know to wonks inside the Beltway) approach to expanding State is entirely plausible. It then would not require the Administration to find new resources.
3. Reporting and Sanctions. This one is largely the fault of Congress, not State, but it will require leadership from Secretary Clinton to fix it. Over the past several decades, Congress has mandated that the Department produce each year a number of major reports on a range of issues, including (just off the top of my head), Human Rights, Religious Freedom, Trafficking in Persons, Narco-trafficking, and Terrorism.
As a result, the Department must use tremendous resources to produce multiple reports, some of which are redundant. For example, the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices includes sections on religious freedom and trafficking. So why do those issues also have separate reports? Because Congress felt that State was not paying sufficient attention to them and decided to make State report on it. In addition, the separate reports require “determinations” that may nor may not lead to sanctions. And each of these reports run into the hundreds of pages. Some run into the thousands.
To make matters worse, Congress mandates new reports (and offices) but does not fund them. So as each of these reports get added to the stack, the Department must foreign service officers to do more and more work with less resources.
Imagine how much time and effort this requires: it’s the bureaucratic version of the old “time to make the donuts — I just made the donuts” commercial. You finish one report, and almost immediately you need to start on another. And each momen a junior foreign service officer spends sitting at her desk in an embassy, writing yet another report, is a lost opportunity to actually get outside the embassy’s walls and talk to real people.
In the case of most of these reports, Congress also has instructed State to produce a list of those countries that do not meet minimal standards (as defined, in most cases, by the Congressional legislation). The end result includes the well-known “state sponsors of terrorism” list and the less-well known list of “countries of particular concern” about religious freedom.
The only problem is that the lists are for little more than show, producing no real efforts to sanction the governments listed (the one exception to this is the terrorism list). Each time one of these lists must be produced, certain parts of the Department do everything they can to keep certain countries off it. For example, there’s a battle almost every year as to whether India should be included on the list of “countries of particular concern.”
The reverse also is true: certain countries get included on a given list not because they actually belong there but because it serves other political ends. For example, does anyone seriously believe anymore that Cuba belongs on the list of countries that sanction terror, where it’s been since 1982? It’s as if the United States continues to believe that Che is running around the jungles of Bolivia.
The end result is a series of highly politicized lists that has little connection to reality. Each list is little more than a reflection of who won that particular set of bureaucratic battles.
That’s just nuts. Congress has a role to play in setting policy, but that doesn’t mean it should stray this far into the weeds. Secretary Clinton would do well to consider approaching the Chairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee and initiate a dialogue on how best to streamline the process. A good starting point would be integrating the reports on human rights, religious freedom, and trafficking in persons into a single document. Another would be elimination of the highly politicized and largely useless lists of problem countries.
4. Soft/Smart Power The fourth — and probably the most daunting — challenge facing the Secretary is how to rebuild the traditional levers of U.S. soft power (or as Secretary Clinton likes to call it, “smart power”). This probably deserves a separate post, so for now let me just note that there are three major challenges.
First, the formerly independent (and incredibly effective) United States Information Agency was gutted and integrated into the State Department during the Clinton Administration, in large part because Senator Jesse Helms (then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) decided that it was unnecessary. We’ve been paying the price ever since. It’s probably unrealistic to reinvent the wheel, but Secretary Clinton still should examine how best to reinvigorate our public diplomacy function.
That means more funding. It also means reestablishing the quasi-independent status of the Public Affairs Officers around the world. At one time, PAOs ran their own offices separate from Embassies, focusing largely on culture and the battle of ideas. Many also included libraries that frequently were the only source of accurate information in repressive regimes. Reestablishing that system is a worthy goal.
Another would be reforming the hodge-podge of broadcasting agencies that now exist, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio Marti, the Voice of America, and the various radio and televisions networks set up as part of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Second, the Administration (and the Secretary) need to decide what to do about the U.S. Agency for International Development. As she noted in her remarks today, development is one of the three legs of U.S. foreign policy (along with diplomacy and defense). But where does USAID fit into this? Is it an independent agency? Is it part of State? Does it deserve, as various folks have proposed, cabinet-level status (as is the case in Great Britain and a number of other countries)?
Clinton’s decision to hold a second welcoming ceremony today at USAID headquarters is a reassuring first step, but it’s not enough. USAID’s current status, with one foot inside State and one out, leaves its leaders unsure of their role and its staff largely demoralized. Furthermore, the tendency by State to establish separate policymaking offices on issues like reconstruction and humanitarian assistance has further muddied the waters,
Third, the Secretary needs to consolidate and streamline funding mechanisms. For example, there are numerous government bodies funding projects in Iraq, frequently without close coordination. But the problem is not limited to Iraq: it’s true almost everywhere the US Government is funding local efforts to alleviate poverty, promote democracy, address chronic illness, or build sustainable legal systems.
Again, part of the problem is Congress. Many of the separate funding mechanisms come from Congressional mandates. Others are the result of bureaucratic battles in which a given institution had legitimate concerns about whether other funding mechanisms would address their concerns. And to top it all off, there’s the reality that no agency likes giving up the ability to give away money.
That’s a pretty full plate for the new Secretary — and it doesn’t even include all the various regional and country-specific challenges she and Obama face. It won’t be easy to make the changes necessary. But if Secretary Clinton wants to make a fundamental difference, she should not let the crisis of the day distract her from these very essential reforms.
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